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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Jerome Harris was charged with a single count of attempted first degree arson 
and a “persistent violator” sentence enhancement (i.e., an enhancement for having two 
prior felony convictions).  At the conclusion of the first phase of Mr. Harris’ bifurcated 
trial, a jury found him guilty of the charged offense.  During the second phase, the jury 
also found him to be a persistent violator.  The district court later imposed a lengthy 
prison sentence (seventeen years, with five years fixed). 
On appeal, Mr. Harris contends the State failed to offer sufficient evidence to 
support the jury’s persistent violator finding and, therefore, the persistent violator 
enhancement must be vacated.  Specifically, although the State offered substantial 
evidence from which a rational trier of fact could find that Mr. Harris had previously been 
convicted of one prior felony and two other offenses, it offered no evidence that either of 
those other two offenses were felonies. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
Mr. Harris was initially charged with a single count of attempted first degree 
arson.  (R., pp.7-8.)1  After he waived his right to a preliminary hearing (R., p.31), he 
was bound over to the district court (R., pp.32-33) and an information was filed charging 
the same offense (R., pp.44-46.) 
Months later, the State was granted leave to file an “information part II,” charging
                                            
1 The Clerk’s Record consists of three electronic (.pdf) files—the Clerk’s Record proper 
(“Harris 43044 cr”), the publicly-available exhibits to the Clerk’s Record (“Harris 43044 
ex”), and the confidential exhibits to the Clerk’s Record (“Harris 43044 psi”).  Only the 
former two are cited herein.  They are identified as “R.” and “R. Ex.,” respectively. 
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a persistent violator sentencing enhancement under I.C. § 19-2514.  (See R., pp.57-60 
(motion); p.64 (court minutes showing State’s motion was granted).)  It immediately did 
so.  (See R., pp.65-66.)  The amended information alleged that Mr. Harris had three 
prior felony convictions in two different Idaho cases, and it identified those alleged 
felony convictions as follows: 
1. Possession of a controlled substance in Ada County Case No. H0600851 
(Aug. 30, 2006); 
2. Trafficking in methamphetamine in Kootenai County Case No. CR-1998-5132 
(Jan. 5, 1999); and  
3. Delivery of methamphetamine in Kootenai County Case No. CR-1998-5132 
(Jan. 5, 1999). 
(R., pp.65-66.) 
Ultimately, Mr. Harris exercised his constitutional right to a jury trial.  (See 
generally Trial Tr.)2  This was a bifurcated trial in accordance with well-established 
precedent.  See, e.g., State v. Roy, 127 Idaho 228, 230 (1995) (“[W]here a criminal 
defendant is charged under the persistent violator statute (I.C. § 19–2514) . . . [t]he trial 
must also be bifurcated. During the first phase, the jury should be read only the first part 
of the information. The trial should then proceed as if there were no allegations of prior 
convictions. Only if the jury returns a guilty verdict on the substantive charge should the
                                            
2 The Reporter’s Transcript consists of three separately-bound transcripts.  However, 
only two of those transcripts—the transcript of the December 15-16, 2014 jury trial and 
the transcript of the February 20, 2015 sentencing hearing—are cited herein.  Those 
two transcripts are cited herein as “Trial Tr.” and “Sent. Tr.,” respectively. 
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second part of the information be read and the jury allowed to consider the recidivist 
charge.”).  At the conclusion of the first phase, the jury found Mr. Harris guilty of 
attempted first degree arson.  (R., p.117; Trial Tr., p.284, L.9 – p.285, L.19.) 
The second phase of the trial was very brief.  The defense presented no 
evidence or arguments of any kind (see Trial Tr., p.289, Ls.11-13, p.290, Ls.20-22, 
p.291, Ls.2-3), and the only evidence presented by the State consisted of three 
documentary exhibits—Exhibits 25, 26, and 27 (see Trial Tr., p.289, L.16 – p.290, 
L.19).3  Exhibit 27 is the September 5, 2006 judgment of conviction in Ada County Case 
No. H0600851.  (R. Ex., pp.19-22.)  It indicates that Mr. Harris was convicted of felony 
possession of a controlled substance in that case.4  (R. Ex., pp.19-22.)  Exhibits 26 and 
25 are the amended information and the January 6, 1999 judgment of conviction, 
respectively, in Kootenai County Case No. CR-98-5132.  (R. Ex., pp.13-16, 17-18.)  
Together, they show that Mr. Harris was charged with, and convicted of, two crimes—
trafficking in methamphetamine (between 28 and 200 grams) and delivery of 
methamphetamine.  (R. Ex., pp.13-16, 17-18.)  Neither document identifies either 
offense as a felony.  (R. Ex., pp.13-16, 17-18.)  Nevertheless, in a special verdict, the 
jury found Mr. Harris to have been a persistent violator under section 19-2514.  
(R., p.118; Trial Tr., p.293, L.7 – p.294, L.11.) 
                                            
3 The State also offered a brief opening statement (see Trial Tr., p.288, L.15 – p.289, 
L.9), although it waived closing arguments (see Trial Tr., p.290, Ls.23-25). 
4 The judgment of conviction not only identifies Mr. Harris by name, but also lists his 
date of birth and social security number (see R. Ex., p.19), both of which a police 
officers had testified to (in the first phase of the trial).  (See Trial Tr., p.144, L.16, p.146, 
L.4, p.167, L.25 – p.168, L.10, p.168, L.23 – p.169, L.1). 
 4 
Months later, the district court imposed upon Mr. Harris a unified sentence of 
seventeen years, with five years fixed.5  (R., pp.123, 125; Sent. Tr., p.21, L.18 – p.22, 
L.1.)  A few days after that, the district court entered a written judgment of conviction.  
(R., pp.124-28.) 
Thereafter, Mr. Harris filed a timely notice of appeal.  (R., pp.131-32.)  On 
appeal, he contends the State failed to offer sufficient evidence to support the jury’s 
persistent violator finding because the State offered sufficient evidence as to only one 
prior felony conviction, not two (or more) prior felony convictions, as is required under 
section 19-2514.  Specifically, he submits that although the State offered sufficient 
evidence for the jury to find that he was convicted of a felony in the 2006 Ada County 
case, it offered no evidence that either of the two convictions in the 1998 Kootenai 
County case was for a felony.  Therefore, he contends the persistent violator 
enhancement and his sentence must be vacated, and his case must be remanded to 
the district court for a new sentencing hearing. 
 
 
                                            
5 Later, Mr. Harris filed a timely motion for a sentence reduction pursuant to Idaho 
Criminal Rule 35.  (R., p.129.)  Although the district court’s order on that motion is not in 
the record on appeal (and will not be augmented into the record on appeal because 
Mr. Harris is not raising any sentencing-related claims on appeal), undersigned counsel 
submits—in case the Court is curious—that the Rule 35 motion was denied.  
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ISSUE 
Did the State offer sufficient evidence that Mr. Harris was previously convicted of two 
felonies, so as to support its finding that he is a “persistent violator of law” within the 
meaning of I.C. § 19-2514? 
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ARGUMENT 
Because The State Failed To Offer Substantial Evidence That Mr. Harris Was 
Previously Convicted Of Two Felonies, There Is Insufficient Evidence To Sustain The 
Jury’s Finding That Mr. Harris Is A “Persistent Violator Of Law” Under I.C. § 19-2514 
A. Introduction 
The State charged Mr. Harris with a persistent violator enhancement pursuant to 
section 19-2514 of the Idaho Code.  (R., pp.65-66.)  Under this enhancement, he faced 
a minimum prison sentence of five years and a maximum sentence of life.  I.C. § 19-
2514.6 
In order for the persistent violator enhancement to apply in a given case, the 
defendant must have been convicted of two prior felonies.  I.C. § 19-2514.7  It is the 
State’s burden to prove the two prior felony convictions beyond a reasonable doubt.  
State v. Schall, 157 Idaho 488, 495 (2014).8  Mr. Harris contends the State failed to 
                                            
6 This represents a dramatic increase in the punishment Mr. Harris faced.  In the 
absence of a persistent violator enhancement, Mr. Harris faced no minimum sentence 
and the maximum sentence he faced was twelve and one-half years.  See I.C. §§ 18-
306(2) (providing that the punishment for an attempt crime where the completed crime 
would have been punishable by between five years and life is one-half of the longest 
permissible term for the completed crime), 18-802 (providing that the punishment for the 
completed crime of first degree arson is “not more than twenty-five (25) years”).  
7 The complete text of section 19-2514 is as follows: 
Any person convicted for the third time of the commission of a felony, 
whether the previous convictions were had within the state of Idaho or were 
had outside the state of Idaho, shall be considered a persistent violator of 
law, and on such third conviction shall be sentenced to a term in the 
custody of the state board of correction which term shall be for not less 
than five (5) years and said term may extend to life. 
8 Idaho precedent is ahead of United States Supreme Court precedent on this point.  In 
Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224 (1998), the United States Supreme 
Court distinguished between elements and sentencing factors, and held that a finding 
that the defendant is a recidivist (which fact was used to dramatically increase the 
maximum punishment) is the latter and, therefore, need not be treated as an element 
and charged in the indictment.  Subsequently, however, the Supreme Court recognized 
that, generally, “any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed 
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meet that burden in this case since, although it offered evidence of three prior 
convictions, it only offered substantial evidence to show that one of those prior 
convictions was a felony. 
B. Standard Of Review 
“A jury’s finding that a defendant is a persistent violator will not be overturned on 
appeal where there is substantial evidence upon which a reasonable trier of fact could 
have found that the prosecution sustained its burden of proving the essential elements 
of the enhancement beyond a reasonable doubt.”  State v. McClain, 154 Idaho 742, 748 
(Ct. App. 2012). 
C. Because The State Failed To Offer Substantial Evidence That Mr. Harris Was 
Previously Convicted Of Two Felonies, There Is Insufficient Evidence To Sustain 
The Jury’s Finding That Mr. Harris Is A Persistent Violator 
When it comes to proving a persistent violator enhancement under section 19-
2514, “The State bears the burden of identifying the defendant as the same individual 
identified in the prior convictions and the burden of identifying the prior crimes as 
felonies.”  McClain, 154 Idaho 747.  In this case, Mr. Harris concedes that the State 
offered sufficient evidence for a reasonable trier of fact to conclude that it met its burden 
                                                                                                                                  
statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable 
doubt.”  Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000).  In so holding, the Court 
carved out an exception—based on Almendarez-Torres—for “the fact of a prior 
conviction.”  Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490, but also strongly suggested—without definitively 
deciding—that the Almendarez-Torres exception is no longer viable.  It explained as 
follows: “Even though it is arguable that Almendarez-Torres was incorrectly decided, 
and that a logical application of our reasoning today should apply if the recidivist issue 
were contested, Apprendi does not contest the decision's validity and we need not 
revisit it for purposes of our decision today . . . .”  Id. at 489-90.   
Mr. Harris submits that under the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process clause, 
and consistent with the general standard of Apprendi, any fact—including the fact of a 
prior conviction—that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory 
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of linking him to the prior convictions.  The two judgments of conviction proffered by the 
State bore Mr. Harris’ name, date of birth, and social security number.  (Compare 
R. Ex., p.13 (first page of judgment in 1998 Kootenai County case) and R. Ex., p.19 
(first page of judgment in 2006 Ada County case) with Trial Tr., p.144, L.16, p.146, L.4 
(Officer Gordon testifying as to Mr. Harris’ date of birth and a portion of his social 
security number) and Trial Tr., p.167, L.25 – p.168, L.10, p.168, L.23 – p.169, L.1) (Det. 
Thorndyke testifying as to Mr. Harris’ date of birth and social security number).) 
Thus, the question relevant to this appeal is whether the State offered sufficient 
evidence for a reasonable trier of fact to conclude that the State met its burden of 
identifying Mr. Harris’ prior convictions as involving felony crimes.  “The State may 
satisfy [this] burden by ‘produc[ing] copies of judgments specifically identifying the 
crimes as felonies, or—if the judgments were not so specific—[by offering] admissible 
copies of the felony statutes applicable to the crimes recited in the judgments.’”  
McClain, 154 Idaho at 747-48 (quoting State v. Smith, 116 Idaho 553, 560 (Ct. App. 
1989)).  Here, the State failed to meet that burden with respect to two of the three 
alleged prior convictions.9  Specifically, the State offered no evidence that either of the 
two convictions in the 1999 Kootenai County (CR-98-5132) case was for a felony.   
The only evidence the State offered with regard to the 1999 Kootenai County 
case were Exhibits 25 and 26—the judgment of conviction and the amended 
                                                                                                                                  
maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.  This is 
apparently what the Idaho Supreme Court has already held in Schall.  
9 Mr. Harris concedes that the judgment of conviction for the 2006 Ada County case 
(H0600851) indicates that his crime of conviction—possession of a controlled 
substance—was a felony.  (See R. Ex., pp.19-21.)  Thus, the State offered sufficient 
evidence for the jury to conclude that Mr. Harris had one prior felony conviction. 
 
 9 
information, respectively.  The judgment of conviction identifies the crimes of conviction 
and the sentences; however, nowhere does it state those crimes are felonies under 
Idaho law.  (See R. Ex., pp.13-16.)  And, although the State also offered the amended 
information, that document likewise failed to identify the charged offenses as felonies.  
(See R. Ex., pp.17-18.)  Thus, from these documents the jury had no evidence from 
which to conclude that the 1999 Kootenai County case resulted in felony convictions.   
In such a circumstance, it was incumbent upon the State to also offer copies of 
the relevant statutes identifying the crimes of conviction as felonies.  McClain, 154 
Idaho at 747-48; Smith, 116 Idaho at 560.  But it failed to do so.  Accordingly, the State 
failed to offer substantial evidence from which a reasonable trier of fact could have 
found, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Mr. Harris was convicted of any felonies in the 
1999 Kootenai County case.  And because the Kootenai County case involved two of 
the three alleged prior convictions, this means the State failed to offer substantial 
evidence from which a reasonable trier of fact could have found, beyond a reasonable 
doubt, that Mr. Harris had two prior felony convictions.  Accordingly, the persistent 
violator enhancement found by the jury is without sufficient evidentiary support and, 
therefore, cannot be sustained.   
 10 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, Mr. Harris respectfully requests that this Court 
vacate the jury’s special verdict finding him to be a persistent violator, as well as his 
sentence, and that it remand his case to the district court for re-sentencing on the un-
enhanced crime of attempted first degree arson. 
 DATED this 27th day of January, 2016. 
 
      __________/s/_______________ 
      ERIK R. LEHTINEN 
      Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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